Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is my privilege

to be with you this morning, and my colleagues and I deeply

appreciate the opportunity to brief you on our recent trip to Darfur,

the second that we’ve made this year to engage with the mission

on the ground and find ways to maximize the deployment of the

force. So, thank you for this opportunity.

You have generously, I think, said that we should not feel responsible

for the lack of progress that has—that we are seeing on

the ground. I’d like to say, in response to that, Mr. Chairman, two

things.

First is that no one can be satisfied with the progress on the

ground to date. We have been talking among ourselves, in the

international community, broadly and specifically, in these corridors

and in the corridors of the United Nations, about Darfur for

4 years. No one can be satisfied at the rate of progress that has

been thus far.

And, second, what I would like to say is that I do feel responsible,

and my colleagues do feel responsible, for our part. But, we

have only a part. The U.N. is a good organization, it’s an important

organization. It is not the only organization. And it is not the only

actor with a role to play in Darfur, as I will describe to you in my

brief remarks.

What is the situation on the ground as we find it? The situation

on the ground in Darfur continues to be deeply troubling from

nearly every angle. Violence continues. It is exacerbated, as you

have said, by the proliferation of militia groups who are now taking

matters into their own hands. Some of them are ideologically motivated,

and some of them are simply motivated by the opportunities

presented in the lawless environment, particularly out in the west.

Population continues to be menaced and threatened. Their circumstances

are exacerbated by a food crisis, as we know, and the

humanitarian situation, as the Chief of Humanitarian—the Office

of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs mentioned yesterday, is

only worsening.

The main goal of the United Nations is to engage in a three-part

strategy in Darfur: A humanitarian strategy, a peacekeeping strategy,

and a strategy that continues and emphasizes and encourages

political talks among the parties, to bring a lasting solution to the

situation in Darfur.

I should back up, Mr. Chairman, and put this mission in the context

of peacekeeping over the last 5 years. I first arrived at the

United Nations in peacekeeping in 2003. At that point, the budget

for all of peacekeeping was approximately $1.8 billion. It is now

over $7 billion. Darfur is the 18th new mission my colleagues and

I have started up in the past 5 years. In the last 18 months alone,

we have done five new peacekeeping missions. Peacekeeping now

represents, with Darfur and with the associated and simultaneously

starting mission in Chad, the second largest deployed military

presence in the world with the functions and responsibilities

that it has. For this, we have a staff of less than 800 in New York.

But, we are complemented by our colleagues in the field, who work

tirelessly under difficult and arduous conditions. I can assure you,

Mr. Chairman, we have no peacekeeping missions in Paris. Our

peacekeeping missions around the world are in some of the most

difficult, challenging, and increasingly dangerous circumstances

that are around the world. Darfur represents, in that context, only

the latest of a series of very difficult situations in which peacekeepers

have been introduced. And the situation is, as I describe

it, a bad one, particularly for the victims, the displaced, and those

who have been terrorized year after year after year as the world

has watched.

The purpose of our recent trip, Mr. Chairman, was to sit down

with the mission and assist them in looking at all of the factors

that need to be assembled in order to maximize the deployment of

the force in 2008. Our goal, of course, is a 100-percent deployment.

We will likely achieve something less than that before the end of

the calendar year, but it is our committed and collective effort to

do what we can to maximize the deployment, not only of the military

force which is so essential for the—to support the delivery of

humanitarian assistance, provide a security backdrop for the political

talks that are going on, but also to provide the very necessary

protection functions that are required in its mandate—to deploy

that force, which will number over 19,000; in addition, to deploy

over 6,000 police, through a combination of both individual policemen

and -women and—which is a relatively new phenomenon in

U.N. peacekeeping, the deployment of formed police units, the mandate

of 1769—Security Council Resolution 1769 calls for the deployment

of 19 such units, which number up to 140 individuals each.

Now, this policing component is an essential component to the success

of UNAMID, as we call the mission in Darfur.

In addition to that, we have projected to deploy over 5,000 civilian

personnel—roughly two-thirds of them will be national civilian

personnel; one-third, international civilian personnel—spread out

over a variety of grades and specialties, numbering over three

dozen.

Our operational concept for the deployment in the coming period

is designed specifically to address some of the questions that you

have raised: The impediments that have presented themselves to

the deployment, the shortfalls that exist, and trying to craft creative

ways to overcome those shortfalls and overcome those impediments.

Essentially, the force will be deployed along the lines of a half

battalion laydown spread out over Darfur. Darfur is a province in

Sudan, a part of Sudan that is the size of France. The total force,

when it is deployed—military, police, and civilian—will number

31,000. This number, we believe, while considering it an extremely

robust mission, may not be all that needs doing on the ground in

Darfur to turn the tide definitively from conflict and allow the population

to exist in peace. But, our deployment and the force commanders’

concept of operation makes the maximum effective use of

the force on the ground. It will be spread over very great distances.

Therefore, it needs the mobility, it needs the command and control,

it needs the self-sustaining assets as part of the deployment of the

forces to maximize their presence to fulfill their mandate.

In this regard, I can tell you that we have had pledges of nearly

all the infantry units that we require. Where we are still lacking

commitments are in key enabling capabilities, Mr. Chairman, some

of which you’ve highlighted, in the area of helicopters, certainly in

long-haul transportation and in other areas. The Member States of

the United Nations have been made aware of these shortfalls that

we continue to have without which this mission will be severely

handicapped in trying to fully implement its mandate.

The operational concept calls for Darfur itself to be broken into

three sectors, and the allocation of these units by sector reflects the

force commander’s and the head of mission’s judgment regarding

the critical areas where the protection responsibilities are greatest

initially. It’s also designed to give the leadership in the mission,

which is jointly answerable to the United Nations and to the African

Union, which has been fully involved itself in every phase of

planning and implementation of this operation, to be—to give them

the flexibility they need to respond to an unfolding circumstance on

the ground.

I want to take a moment, Mr. Chairman, because it is my specific

set of responsibilities to address the logistical personnel, financial,

and other operational aspects of the mission, to spend a moment

on what is needed now.

What is needed now, fundamentally, is land to deploy all of these

forces, but not just terrain on the ground; we also need land with

associated proximate water access so that this force can be sustained.

Part of our water strategy, I should point out, Mr. Chairman,

at the outset and for the years that we have had it under development,

is a water-sharing strategy, because we are aware that,

certainly, this is at the heart of so much privation in the region.

And so, we represent a large consumer of water when we come in,

and so, our strategy, again, at the outset, and as we have developed

it over time, is designed to share that water with the population

and in full concert and consciousness of the demands that we

will be presenting in what is already a very fragile system in place.

So, land, associated water rights, this requires drilling for water in

an environment where proven water sources are far between and

uncertain to establish.

We need engineering capability to accelerate the deployment of

forces on the ground. We have spoken to a number of troop-contributing

countries about how to configure their forces through their

initial deployment to bring, as an organic part of their capacity, a

pioneering or light-engineering ability to facilitate the introduction

of forces until such time as the U.N. can follow through with our

normal logistics package and sustain them over time.

We talk a lot about self-sustainment in the context of U.N. deployment,

and here in Darfur, this will be key. The units must

come equipped, trained on the equipment that they have, with organic

mobility, command and control, and communications, as I

mentioned before, to administer and discharge their operational responsibilities,

as well as provide for their self-sustainment in the

camps and as they are out in operations. This will be key. The ability

of the force to deploy robustly in this year will depend on the

self-sustaining ability of the troop-contributing countries.

In this regard, Mr. Chairman, I should say that partner countries,

including, specifically, the United States and others, have

been extremely important in partnering with many of the TCCs on

the ground to help provide them the enabling capabilities they

need to meet their requirements of troop deployments and operations.

This engagement of the partners must continue. We will not

be able to mount and sustain this force and present the kind of

foundation for the onward deployment of subsequent troops and

forces if the elements that are currently present are not brought

up to strength, in terms of the U.N. numbers that we require and

their sustainability and mobility, and command-and-control capacities

are enhanced, as well. For this, the partnering countries will

be critical.

I mentioned before, Mr. Chairman, that we, in the U.N., do feel

responsible for our role in helping to get this mission in on the

ground as we feel for every mission that we deploy. And, as I mentioned

briefly in my remarks, the troop-contributing countries

themselves have a responsibility, and the partnering countries

have responsibilities, as well, to stay engaged with the troop contributors,

with the United Nations, with the mission on the ground,

with the African Union, and with the neighboring countries, as

well, to do what they can, and do what they can, Mr. Chairman,

not only for the operation that’s on the ground, but for the peace

process, as well.

The purpose of peacekeeping is to protect and strengthen fragile

peace. That’s why the world has peacekeepers. And we, in the

United Nations, who have been doing peacekeeping—this year

marks the 60th anniversary of United Nations peacekeeping—understand,

through many lessons over those years, many bitter lessons

through the decade of the nineties, the conditions under which

peacekeepers are right to deploy and when they can maximally

contribute to a durable peace. There must be a peace to keep.

Peacekeepers can usefully accompany political processes. We cannot

substitute for the lack of those processes.

And, as you rightly pointed out, Mr. Chairman, the peace process

for Darfur needs the attention and care and engagement of the

international community, and of all key actors with a role to play,

to encourage the parties to come to talk and pursue their continuing

differences around a peace table.

The Government of Sudan, of course, itself has responsibilities.

I meet with them every time I go to the region, both in the region

and in Khartoum, engage them at an operational level with the

pragmatic challenges that we have on the ground. It’s my view

they clearly understand what their roles and responsibilities are.

It’s a continuing dialog and challenge for us.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to close the way I began, by

thanking you for this opportunity that you’ve given to my colleagues

and I to brief you this morning, to thank the United States,

not only for its role and attention that it has paid to the problem

in Darfur, but to thank the United States for its contribution to

peacekeeping over 60 years, and for its contributions and support

to the United Nations. The United Nations is an extraordinary institution.

It’s not perfect. We, in peacekeeping, are not perfect. But,

it does represent the kind of aspiration where the world can pool

its strengths to share its burden, and it’s our privilege to be a part

of it.

Thank you very much.

At every level, this is an extremely relevant question

for us in the United Nations. We have our own piece, the Chad operation,

to deploy. That operation consists, really, of three parts:

The EUFOR, which you described; the United Nations mission,

which will be about 1,200 and that mission is designed to support

the third component; the 800 Chadian police, whose job it will be

to bring security to the camps and to the refugee sites and to the

IDP sites and to the surrounding cities. That operation is being

stood up simultaneous to our effort to stand up Darfur.

So, from the U.N.’s perspective, it is there——

Certainly, the European component of this tripartite

mission will be. They project to stand up—to be at initial operating

capability—by May. And that is with the bulk of their force.

As you know, the U.N. has no standing military.

We have no standing training. We have very little

doctrine. We’ve just begun to write that. We have no standing

civilian cadre of personnel. Every single mission is, to a certain extent,

stood up as if for the first time. We are able to rely on troop-

contributing countries that, themselves, feel stretched around the

world. There is not only the operation in Chad, but other operations,

as well, which are pressing down on troop-contributing

countries and police-contributing countries.

But, your point about the presence of a robust force on both sides

of the border, frankly, Mr. Chairman, is what’s necessary, and

we’re aiming to do our part.

Mr. Chairman, I am no expert on the tribal or ethnic

politics of Darfur, but I can tell you that the so-called militias, the

Janjaweed, in addition, have used force against populations that

are themselves unarmed, that live in huts and encampments made

of twigs, that burn these to the ground. There are other actors, as

well, engaged. Very few conflicts, in my experience, exist in splendid

isolation. There is the existence of forces, there is the existence

of funding, there is the existence of ammunition that fuels these

groups in targeting innocent civilians in a conflict that, in some instance,

traces itself, deep roots, in the region——

In some instance——

Again, Senator, I’m really not the best person to ask

for the kind of detailed information that you’re asking in this regard.

I have a layman’s understanding of that element of it. My

focus has been on the U.N.’s logistics effort and peacekeeping effort

to address the situation on the ground, and I don’t want, under the

pressure of time, to make a misstatement that would be misleading

in this context. But we can certainly provide the detailed information,

that I know my colleagues have, to you.

Senator, the conflict in Sudan, in Darfur, is, by some

experts’ description—a reflection of the conflict that also existed,

North/South, a deep question of identity and political enfranchisement

of those identities in Sudan as a whole. There are a number

of groups that are involved in the talks in Darfur, which have gone

back for several years now. There have been many efforts at bringing

the militias, the warring factions, the government, supported

again around—but with key regional actors around a table. Jan

Eliasson and Dr. Salim Salim, from the African Union, have been

jointly mediating the talks. They have just concluded a 2-week trip

to the region, and it’s very clear that some of the key groups have

determined that fighting is the preferred strategy to talking. And

this is why I mentioned, in my remarks, that all of the key actors

need to stay engaged to put the pressure on those parties to pursue

meaningful talks in an effort to create the kind of viable dialogue

that a peacekeeping mission can support.

All of the above.

Thank you, Senator.

I, too, am always struck by the way we talk about death and

dying in the context of conflict. I had an uncle who wrote a poem

once, called ‘‘Stars and Atoms Have No Size.’’ And it’s true. I mean,

how can you imagine a star or an atom? And we talk about conflict,

and we talk about war in a way that, at times, offends me.

I spent the first half of my adult life as a soldier in the United

States Army. And one thing you learn as a soldier early on is,

people die one at a time. In the end, numbers can add up pretty

quickly.

We talk about the Rwandan genocide; it was 800,000 people in

90 days. In Darfur, it’s two-thirds of the population of 6 million—

4 million people have been affected by this conflict. The brutality

has been staggering. Part of the tragedy is that people forget why.

So, I take the numbers very seriously, and I share your sensibility.

This is a challenge of monumental proportions. We’ve used the

word ‘‘intractable’’ several times this morning. Can that really be

so? Can it be we are so bereft of ideas and of things and of knowledge

to do something about this? And our part of it, and my part

of this, is the peacekeeping effort.

You mentioned the effectiveness of sanctions. Before I joined the

U.N., I had the privilege of working with former Secretary of State

Cyrus Vance and David Hamburg, the former president of Carnegie

Corporation of New York, on the Carnegie Commission on Preventing

Deadly Conflict. And some of you around—Senator Lugar,

certainly, and others I had the privilege of associating with during

that work—and we examined the role of sanctions. Are they effective?

If not, why not? What does it take to make an effective sanctions

regime? And the work was not purely theoretical. It was,

What does it take? And what we learned is that sticks are not

enough. Sticks have to be balanced against carrots, an upside. Because

sticks against returning to the status quo, the status quo is

no reward, so the sticks have to be balanced against an upside.

What is in it on an upside to make the sanctions have more bite?

But, sanctions are a necessary step, in the mind of many governments,

before they can take more stringent measures.

As a peacekeeper in the United Nations, it is not for me to pronounce

myself on the advisability of a sanctions regime, its dimensions,

et cetera. But, it is very clear that the conflict that continues

to rage in Darfur is still funded, it is still supplied with arms and

ammunition, and they are coming from somewhere.

On the question of helicopters, this has been a deep puzzlement

to me, personally. You—the chairman, in his remarks, mentioned

that he had meetings with the African Union. And, depending on

whom you speak to in the African Union, they are very forthright

and honest about what the challenges are and what the challenges

were when they agreed to go into Darfur when no one else would.

And they needed everything from boots to Black Hawks, in some

cases.

And do we need helicopters? This is a region the size of France.

We have a military force of 19,000. There are 4,000 helicopters

available, I understand, in the inventory of the NATO countries,

collectively. Are there not 24 for Darfur?

So, we are working with the Member States of the United Nations,

including with the United States. Ambassador Williamson

has been aggressive in his efforts to find creative solutions. So,

we’re turning over every stone.

I—Senator, I wouldn’t presume to—I’ll tell you what

we are exploring. We are exploring whether or not we can find—

our preferred solution is to go to a contributing country to give a

complete squadron of helicopters, with the airframes, with the pilots,

with the maintenance package, as a self-contained unit to operate

the way this government recognized its military operating, or

anyone else, for that matter. Second, we’re looking to—for countries

to put on—offer what they can. Again, equipping the airframes

with the pilots and the maintenance package. Failing that, we’re

looking at each of these pieces—airframes, pilots, maintenance

packages—to see what can be put together.

We deeply appreciate the effort that has been undertaken by the

chairman and by Senator Lugar in this regard, and by others in

this committee. And we will continue to look for them.

Does this mean the mission won’t deploy? No; the mission will

deploy. But, it will not be as operationally effective as it needs to

be without these assets.

Thank you, sir.

Do we need a new organizational structure? I’ll tell you what we

need in peacekeeping. We need a strategic planning capacity. We

need a standing brigade-sized force—that is ready, able, equipped,

deployable—to move into a situation while there’s still a peace to

keep, or to prevent a conflict from spreading unacceptably. World

Bank data show that when ongoing conflict has an adverse effect

800 kilometers away, within—if you drew a circle around a conflict

zone that had a radius of 800 kilometers, you would find the affected

zone of that conflict. We need a cadre of professional people

skilled in a variety of areas, everything from human rights monitoring

to political analysis to engineering, aviation safety, and

everything in between, that is deployable on a moment’s notice

within the context of rules and accountability, that can assure

Member States that we are reflecting their collective will.

So, the organizations exist. There are regional organizations—the

African Union, the EU. There are other organizations, such as

NATO and others around the world, and the United Nations. The

United Nations is unique, in that it is deeply inclusive. We have

an ability to mobilize complexity. It’s not always pretty. But, we

can reach resources around the world—governmental, nongovernmental,

international. And, again, reflecting the engagement of the

Member States.

Is it a lack of political will? You know, the old expression, ‘‘When

you want to do something, any excuse will do. When you don’t want

to do something, any excuse will do.’’ Is it political will, or is it the

fact that we all exist in an environment of constrained choice? And

where are your priorities? If a problem is intractable, is it because

we don’t understand the problem? Is it because we lack the capacity,

or it’s because we don’t have good theories of remedy in trying

to solve that problem? All of the above. Is some answer a new, as yet

uninvented organization? Perhaps. But, I think the tools are on

the table at the moment.

It’s all——

I will only speak for myself, Senator, and for the issues

under my control. And that’s a question I also ask, Why is this not

happening? What’s happening? What’s not happening? How we can

effect the difference? And there are reasons that are unacceptable,

there are reasons that are unexplainable.

You know, is it a lack of contributions? In some cases, we don’t

have it. The U.N.—we don’t own all of our troops, we don’t own all

of our equipment. We depend on the contributions of the Member

States. We depend on the agreement of the government to facilitate

our operations in and on the ground. We depend, in part, on commercial

contractors, and the contracting process is, as you know,

for the United Nations, is not unlike in the United States—long,

difficult, and engaged. So, it—none of these reasons are satisfying.

Senator, in this respect, I’m—I apologize, I’m not as

current as you on the information of the last several days, but

what I will say is, it is incumbent on the Member States of the organization

to uphold the required—under international law and on

the basis of their own commitments, to uphold the rules and—of

the organization and of the pronouncements of the Security Council.

This is not a wish, this is a requirement. They agreed to be

bound by its provisions. It’s not appropriate, as a U.N. official, to

comment on—or to engage in——

Bilateral behavior——

Yes, sir.

For our part, Senator, the presence of the peacekeeping

force in and on the ground, the existence of a robust political

dialog among the warring parties, will create an environment

where—that will alter—it is our—it is not only our expectation, it

is our hope and expectation that that will alter the circumstances

on the ground.

Member States are—have available to themselves a whole host

of bilateral means of engaging on these questions, in addition. But,

it is our responsibility, job, and obligation to get this peacekeeping

mission in, to create the circumstances that are better for the people

of Darfur on the ground, and for the Member States to use all

of their means to help that be so, and to help reduce the levels of

violence.

Thank you, Senator.

It is—it’s, indeed, a concern. I heard, in my talks in Khartoum,

government officials were certainly watching the situation in Chad,

as well, for their own reasons. The peacekeeping mission in Chad

is a separate mission from the mission in Darfur, but obviously

there is a common border, and the dynamic is such—it’s a very porous

border, and the situations bear on each other measurably.

In the broader regional context, as I mentioned earlier, no conflict

exists in splendid isolation. Our strategy in Darfur has three

parts: Engage with the humanitarian situation on the ground to

bring relief to those who are suffering; to support a political process

designed to bring those warring factions to a table to broker their

differences at that table, as opposed to military force; and to introduce

the peacekeeping force on the ground for the protection of innocent

civilians, to support the peace process, and to facilitate that

humanitarian agenda; and also to bring regional—to provide an anchor

point for stability in that region.

Well, there are several out there. There’s the——

Yes, sir. That’s what we do. That’s what I do. It is—

we stand up every mission each time as if for the first time, with

the exception of in—the OPTEMPO for us over the past 5 years

has been intense. We currently have 20 peacekeeping missions on

the ground.

Every mission consists of some combination of three things: What

the U.N. is able to bring to the table or put on the ground, what

the troop-contributing countries, and, increasingly, police-contributing

countries, can put on the ground, and what services we can

contract out for commercially. So, every mission is some combination

of those three things.

We actually have very little standing capacity, as I mentioned.

We have no cadre of civilian personnel. We have no standing military

capacity. We have no——

My—the Department of Field Support, which I oversee,

has 442 people, in New York, and there is nothing standing

between them and, actually, 35 missions out in the field. They

liaise with them directly. There are no intervening headquarters.

And, you’re right, we have to find the personnel every single time.

Every vacancy is an individual vacancy. Every travel is an individual

travel. We have roughly, at the moment, 27,000 civilian

posts authorized in peacekeeping worldwide. They’re managed by

an office of about 125, in New York.

It feels like that, a lot of days. But, we rely on the

Member States. Each mission has its own headquarters element,

leadership element. It’s supported by headquarters, in addition to

my department, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has

another 600 individuals. We total about 1,000, collectively, overseeing—

but, we do rely on the contributions of the Member States.

Each mission is stood up largely to be self-contained and self-sufficient,

from an operations point of view, in terms of implementing

its mandate and sustaining itself, supported back in New York by

the headquarters and by the important role of the troop- and police-

contributing countries, which rotate.

The challenge is an enormous one. We have a fairly chronic 25-

percent vacancy rate of our civilian personnel in the field. We say

that we will have 140,000 peacekeepers in the field when Darfur

is deployed. We actually manage, annually, about twice that number,

because all the troops rotate every 6 months—the majority of

the troops rotate every 6 months. It is a way of doing business that

has come to characterize the U.N.’s approach to peacekeeping. And

this is—this is as hard as it gets. It’s as hard as it gets.

That’s not how we view it.

It’s both—it’s both the minimum necessary and the

best possible that the international is able to provide a situation

like that. We’re the operators. These—we choose none of our missions

on the ground. These are a function of political choice. Our

job is to mobilize, deploy, support, and operate the resources—the

human, the materiel, and other resources on the ground that have

been given an enormous challenge and privilege by the international

community.

We are not——

We’re not built for failure.

Yes, sir.

Sir, certainly—and my colleagues in the U.S. Government

will speak for themselves—the United States has been fully

engaged in helping us find the helicopter assets that we need.

Yes, sir.

Yes, sir. Every conversation that I have with U.S. officials

is extremely supportive, and they recognize what—the challenges

that exist, and are working with us along these lines that

I outlined before, in trying to find creative ways to solve the problem,

to meet the shortfall.

Sir, I’ll—that’s—I’ll ask my colleagues from the U.S.

Government to respond to that.

Sir, there are 192 member nations of—Member States

of the United Nations. And we have been unsuccessful with any of

them.

I am—my responsibility is for the logistical operations

personnel and support aspects; yes, sir.

Yes, sir.

Eighty percent.

Yes, sir.

Yes, sir.

Yes, sir.

We have spoken to the troop-contributing countries

about—they have conducted their reconnaissance. We have, at the

moment, streaming in what we call COE, contingent-owned equipment,

from several of them. We will have additional battalions

from a number of the existing troop-contributing countries on the

ground. We are engaging the partners—that is to say, the nontroop-

contributing countries—to engage with other countries who

are willing to put troops on the ground, to ready them in the area

of equipment, important training, mobility, command and control.

As I mentioned before, we are bidding out a multifunction logistics

contract to facilitate the support to these units on the ground. We

are asking them to deploy, self-sufficient, with a light-engineering

capacity, to—because they will be going into brownfield sites. So,

yes, we are working out the detailed planning to accelerate the

force deployment.

We—the numbers—the total force of UNAMID, the

total mission size, is just over 31,000, consisting of military, police,

including formed units and individual police, and civilians. We

project to have 80 percent of those numbers on the ground, if we—

if our assumptions hold true, if the partners stay engaged, if the

government continues to allow us to deploy smoothly. So, yes.

Are there planning assumptions in that? Yes; there are. Is it a

plan? Yes; it’s a plan.

We’re going to continue to stay engaged with the government,

both at the national level and at the regional level, and

throughout, from the port of entry, Port Sudan, through to the forward-

positioning sites of these battalions. That’s our job. And then,

we’re going to have to stay engaged.

I absolutely disagree.

Yes, I would.

You know, I’m—we have explored—as I mentioned,

Senator, when I started, this is the 18th new mission I’ve done in

5 years. We have both expertise and we have some experience

under our belt about how to put a mission in on the ground, what

it takes to mobilize the civilian expertise, the military expertise.

We know how to do it when it’s easy, and we know how to do it

when it’s hard. Have we been as creative as we should be? Probably

not. Have we done our best? We can always do better. Have

we been flexible? The system is not really designed for flexibility.

Have we stretched the limit—the system to its limits? Yes, and

we’ll continue to do so.

But, I don’t agree, and I don’t think my colleagues deserve an accusation

of inflexibility and a lack of creativity. But, we’ll—we just

have to stay at it, and we have to continue to work to do our best.

I always feel like I should never speak for others. I

was born into the middle of seven children, and it’s not a habit I

developed. From Jersey. It’s—there’s a certain—dealing with

reality that you have. My reality, Senator, is getting that operation

in on the ground. Who’s responsible? You won’t like my answer. We

all are. We’re all doing everything we can. We’re all, every day,

waking up and looking at our hands, saying, ‘‘How are we acquitting

ourselves today?’’ You know? Are we all doing everything—the

answer, of course, is ‘‘No.’’ Could we be doing more? Yes; we could

do more. Could the Government of Sudan do more? Sure. Could the

leaders of the people under duress do more? Could the leaders of

these militias and the groups that insist to pursue their agenda by

fighting do more and do better? Yes. Could the regional actors do

more? Could the international community do more? Yes. We can all

do more.

What I—I can only answer that for myself, Senator.

What we have to do is—we’ve been given a challenge to deploy a

31,000-person force onto the ground in Darfur. I need some help to

do that. I can’t do it by myself. We can’t do it—the U.N. can’t do

all that needs doing, and all that needs doing can’t be done alone.

I need the Member States to continue to stay engaged politically,

both through the Government of Khartoum and with those parts of

the warring factions on the ground with which they have influence.

And they do. We need the regional actors of prominence to engage

and—supportive of the political process that has been led by Mr.

Eliasson and Dr. Salim Salim. We need troop-contributing countries

willing to put their forces on the ground. We need countries

who don’t have, or for other reasons cannot, put forces on the

ground to be willing to equip those forces, to help train them, and

to provide them with the means necessary to discharge their operational

mandate on the ground, and achieve their self-sustainability.

We need a lot of things and all of these things. There’s no simple

answer.

Yes, sir.

It—Senator, it’s challenging, because we have no existing

capacity. So, every time a mission is developed, a mandate is

given by the Security Council, we go to the Member States and

compose the force, unit by unit by unit, from the Member States

that are willing to put their soldiers on offer, their peacekeepers,

their police men and women on offer. We design the force and we

compose it, and then we go to the troop—our familiar troop-contributing

countries and others and ask them, can they provide this battalion,

can they provide a transportation unit, can they provide a

helicopter squadron? Every time, one by one.

Oh, they’re—and, by and large, they are followed

through on. But, for our major troop-contributing countries, for example,

they agree to a force deployment. It goes through the political

process of being acknowledged, agreed, and formulated into a

coherent peace operation strategy for the ground. The units then—

or the countries, the contributing countries then go through the

process of preparing their units for deployment to those specific circumstances

in the area where you’re asking them to go, easily recognizable

by anyone in the U.S. military as the standard way of

preparing a force for a specific application in mission duties on the

ground. They conduct a reconnaissance. They mobilize the equipment

that they need. They train their soldiers. Sometimes they

don’t have the equipment or the training hasn’t yet occurred. We

need, then, to work with them. They need to work bilaterally with

other partners to augment their capabilities with this additional

equipment. It all takes time.

Senator, with your permission, again, I am familiar

with, but I fear it would be too superficial for your interests. The

array of militia groups on the ground, the various SLA factions, the

SLM, the JEM, et cetera, we can provide that information——

To the committee with an assessment of,

by and large, their agenda that is in play.

The force has the—it is a force that is equipped to defend

itself and to use force, if necessary, to discharge its mandate.

There has—it is a force that has been under attack. Eleven soldiers

were killed in an attack on one of our camps in Haskanita. It was

essentially a fixed encampment with nothing between it, the forces

that were sleeping—it was a nighttime attack—and acres and acres

and miles and miles of dirt—nothing between them and as far as

the eye can see, except concertina wire. And these soldiers were,

tragically, killed. It is, therefore, important to us—we know there

is still fighting going on—it is important to us that this force have

the political backing of all of the Member States, that it have the

support of the government, that it be well equipped, well trained,

and ready to defend itself for these kinds of contingencies. So—and,

yes, it is—we are designing a force. It is not a warfighting force.

It is a peacekeeping force; nevertheless, armed to use force, if necessary,

to discharge its mandate.

January was the most recent.

Senator, I will—I’m a little in danger of repeating myself,

so forgive me, but—I can tell you what we need, to do robust

peacekeeping. We—there must be a peace to keep. You will decide

for yourself if you have—the Senate has a role in enforcing that

process. There must be unanimity in the Council and political unanimity

and consensus among the Member States of support for this

mission in every way possible, in their bilateral relations, in their

multilateral relations, as well. There must be willing troop-contributing

countries who have the capacity, because a peacekeeping mission

is not just about numbers, it’s about the capacity of those

numbers to discharge their mandate on the ground in difficult, austere,

and dangerous circumstances, including, when necessary, the

use of force.

Some of our troop contributors lack key capacities, and

partnering countries, such as the United States, have been very

supportive in the past. We’re very grateful for that support. They

need to continue to stay engaged and do everything they can to ensure

that the follow-on forces committed into the peacekeeping mission

have the capacity that they need, as well.

Coming back to the chairman’s point earlier, the only thing about

the standing force is, every idea whose time has come began as an

idea ahead of its time. This is an idea whose time has come. We

need a robust strategic planning capacity at the United Nations.

We need the ability to draw on standing resources, material, personnel

of all kinds. This is not spending money on peacekeeping,

this is investing in the capacity of this organization to mount and

sustain these operations instead of doing them ad hoc or in haste.

No, sir.

We don’t see each other that much, sir.

What I would say in response, Senator, is that there

has—there had been a traditional avoidance of using any of the

Permanent-Five Members of the Security Council in a very large

way in peacekeeping, with a few important exceptions. That traditional——

By and large, Senator, the—that is not a major feature

of the conversation. It is the other commitments that exist that

permit or preclude Member States from committing. And the same

is true with the United States.

Thank you.

I was a major, sir.

I have a 3-year-old.

Sir, if you’ll permit me, Mr. Chairman, I—you have

been very kind, and the Senators have been very kind in complimenting

me, and I would just like to say, in response, is that the

ones who deserve the compliments are the young men and women,

the young soldiers who are peacekeepers, who go to these places

expecting the worst humanity has to offer, and the young civilians,

some of whom I have with me today, who go to these places believing

in the best humanity has to offer. This is the combination of

peacekeeping. And, sir, it’s my privilege just to be one of their

number.